The International Monetary Fund: Public and Private International Law Aspects by Parker, Sarah E.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 47 | Number 4 Article 5
6-1-1969
The International Monetary Fund: Public and
Private International Law Aspects
Sarah E. Parker
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sarah E. Parker, The International Monetary Fund: Public and Private International Law Aspects, 47 N.C. L. Rev. 836 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol47/iss4/5
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The International Monetary Fund: Public and Private
International Law Aspects
When England devalues the pound sterling, the Dow Jones Average
plummets, and stockholders squirm. When inflation diminishes the pur-
chasing power of the dollar, housewives worry and headache powder sales
increase. When the President discourages foreign travel, the natives get
restless, and tourist travel abroad skyrockets. When Congress passes a
surtax, savings accounts dwindle, and the future appears dismal. Thus
few people are unaffected as authorities use words such as "shock,"
"fluctuation," and "unrest" to describe the world monetary scene.
Nor are the fiscal and monetary problems peculiar to the United States.
Economic crises are international in scope, and frequently, the value of a
nation's currency, especially that of a developing nation, is threatened and
progress jeopardized. Operating at the heart of the world monetary system
to alleviate and avert such economic crises is the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Although infrequently mentioned in the press, this giant
"pawn shop," organized amidst the World War II fervor for interna-
tional organization and co-operation, has added a new dimension to inter-
national law. Unlike many international organizations, the IMF has legal
significance both in public and private international law. It is the latter
aspect, of course, which gives the area practical relevance to the practi-
tioner, but the broader, perhaps more esoteric, significance of the former
should not be ignored.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The conditions and needs which catalyzed the organization of the IMF
are summarized in the following statement by President Kennedy:
The war torn nations of Europe and the Far East faced difficult tasks
of reconstruction with depleted and inadequate capital resources. There
was a need for redistribution of the financial resources and the financial
strength of the free world. And there was an equal need to organize a
flow of capital to the impoverished and under-developed countries of the
world.1
Against this background and with the recognition that the insular policies
of the past would have to yield to collaboration and co6peration, the
'H. AUFRICHT, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND app. VII, at 111 (1964)
(from an address by John F. Kennedy at the 1963 IMF Annual Meeting) [herein-
after cited as AUFRICHT].
[Vol. 47
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Bretton Woods Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Articles of
Agreement or the Fund Agreement) was adopted at the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
on July 22, 1944.2 After twenty-two nations meeting the requirements
specified in the Fund Agreement3 had accepted it, the Agreement entered
into force on December 27, 1945. As a result, a new institution having
full juridical personality with the capacity to contract, to acquire and
dispose of property and to institute legal proceedings came into existence.4
More important, however, the member nations became subject to new
rules of public international law, and the IMF acquired assets to assist
members in observing the new rules.'
Until that time par values, exchange rates, and restrictions on pay-
ments and transfers were subject only to the caprice of each sovereign; now
they were matters of international moment. The efficacy of the Articles is
found in the obligations that each member undertakes in joining
the IMF. A nation's commitment to these obligations is probably the
single most vital factor in the operation of the IMF, for these obligations
represent the rules of good conduct with respect to monetary policy, which
have created an atmosphere conducive to growth and freedom." There-
fore, each member upon associating with the IMF must represent that it
has accepted the Fund Agreement "in accordance with its law and has
taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all its obligations
' 7
under the Agreement. Thus, depending on the constitution and enabling
legislation of each nation, the Articles in their entirety or specific pro-
visions thereof become the law of that land.' On July 31, 1945, Congress
2Id. at 9.
' This Agreement shall enter into force when it has been signed on behalf of
governments having sixty-five percent of the total quotas set forth in Schedule
A and when the instruments referred to in Section 2(a) of this Article have
been deposited on their behalf, but in no event shall this Agreement enter into
force before May 1, 1945.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XX, § 1 (1945)
[hereinafter cited as ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT]. When the Articles actually entered
into force twenty-two countries representing seventy-seven percent of the total
quotas had accepted the Fund Agreement. AUFRICHT 20.
'ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IX, § 2.
' J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1965) [hereinafter cited as IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAW]. The majority of
pamphlets and materials referred to in this writing are publications of the IMF.
'J. Gold, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 1-2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as IMF & PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS].
' ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XX, § 2(a).
AUFRICHT 10.
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enacted the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, which authorized the Presi-
dent to accept membership for the United States in the IMF and the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).o
As stated in Article I, the purposes of the Fund are to provide a means
of collaboration and consultation concerning monetary problems; to en-
courage growth of international trade and productivity of the members,
to promote exchange stability, to eliminate exchange restrictions; and
to make resources available to eliminate maladjustments in the balance
of payments. The somewhat limited scope of these purposes is illumined
by reference to the broader scheme of which the IMF is a part, for it was
contemplated that there would be three postwar economic institutions,
namely, the IBRD, the IMF and a world trade organization. Under this
arrangement, the IBRD would meet the needs of the countries for long
range capital investment, the IMF would be concerned with short term
problems such as balance of payments and currency stabilization, and the
trade organization would promote international trade by reducing those
obstacles that hindered international trade."0 Although the trade organiza-
tion as such has not come into existence, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade has partially filled the gap caused by the absence of an official
organization. Whenever the Contracting Parties to the Agreement en-
counter monetary problems, they must consult with the IMF and accept
its decision." Thus, some degree of concord is achieved in the related
fields of trade and payments.
THE OBLIGATIONS
Having applied for membership in the IMF, a member must estab-
lish a par value for its currency. 2 This obligation is essential to the opera-
tions of the IMF and a condition precedent to use of its assets by a mem-
ber because in the philosophy of the IMF the par value regime is funda-
mental to the maintenance of exchange stability. A member may not resort
to fluctuating rates of exchange to solve balance of payments problems."
Although this policy has been severely criticized by economists, the IMF
has consistently held that irrespective of the persuasiveness of members'
'In accepting the Articles of Agreement the United States specified that article
IX, sections 2 through 9 and the first sentence of article VIII section 2(b) should
have the force of law. United States Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 286 (1964).
" IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAw 2-3.
211 d.




arguments for fluctuating rates, it cannot give its approval.14 Exceptions
to the par value system, which presupposes single and fixed rates, are
justifiable "only under special circumstances and for temporary periods."' 5
Traditionally, of course, the value of a nation's currency is a decision
entirely within the discretion of each individual government. By under-
taking to establish a par value in terms of gold or of a United States
dollar of fixed gold content,' 6 members have relinquished a degree of
sovereignty.' 7 The concession has not been total, however, for a proposed
change in the par value can be made only by the member.'8 Although IMF
consultation is necessary before making any change, only those changes
greater than ten percent of the initial par value require IMF approval. 9
To obtain such approval the member must show that a fundamental dis-
equilibrium ° exists, which cannot be corrected by restructuring economic
policies and utilizing fund assistance. If the IMF should withhold approval,
the member is not bound by the decision and may proceed to institute
the change without being accused of violating the treaty. However, the
IMF may impose sanctions applicable to members that fail to perform
obligations under the Agreement.2'
Once the member establishes the par value, it is under a duty to en-
force this rate of exchange in all transactions taking place in its territories
that involve its own and another member's currency. It is not obligated,
though, to maintain this exchange rate in transactions involving its own
currency with that of a nonmember.22 The means by which the exchange
rate is maintained is left to the wisdom of each member,' but any varia-
tions must be within one percent for spot transactions and within margins
established by the IMF for other transactions.24
Id.
iCINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 62 (1962).
The provision reads:
The par value of the currency of each member shall be expressed in terms
of gold as a common denominator or in terms of the United States dollar of
the weight and finess in effect on July 1, 1944.
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 1 (a).IMF & PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONs 2.
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 5(b).
1 Id. art. IV, § 5(c) (i) & (ii). See also AUFRICHT 45-46.
'0 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 5 (a).
21IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAW 14.
2Id. at 13; ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 4(b).
o The method most often used to maintain the exchange rate is for the member's
monetary authorities to intervene in the exchange markets. IMF & PRIVATE BUsI-
NESS TRANSACTIONS 3.
11ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 3.
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A second major obligation imposed upon members is to eliminate re-
strictions on the making of payments and transfers for current interna-
tional transactions unless these restrictions are authorized by the Articles.25
This undertaking is consistent with and reinforces one of the primary
purposes of the IMF:
To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination
of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world
trade 26
Ultimately, the desired effect of this obligation in relation to the IMF
is to make the choice of currency in which settlements of current interna-
tional transactions are made largely irrelevant.T
Under this provision, a government must refrain from attempts to
limit or prohibit the use or availability of an exchange for current interna-
tional transactions, but it may formulate a procedure which a citizen must
follow to obtain the currency, provided the procedure is reasonable.2" If
a member refuses to allow its residents to make payment abroad in domestic
currency for international transactions or to obtain foreign currency for
such purposes, then the member is deemed to be imposing restrictions and
thereby violating the Articles, unless the restriction is one approved by
- Id. art. VIII, § 2(a). It should be noted that members of the IMF can be
divided into two classes depending upon the obligations which they have undertaken
in joining. One class contains those members who have given notice under Article
XIV, § 3 that they are able to undertake the stringent obligations of Article VIII,
§§ 2, 3, & 4. The other group is composed of those members who joined under the
transactional arrangements of Article XIV. The reason for having the second
class was a recognition on the part of the IMF that some nations that would most
need the benefits of membership were not in an economic position to remove the
restrictions prohibited by the Fund Agreement. Therefore, under limited circum-
stances and careful scrutiny by the IMF, nations have been permitted to retain
restrictions when necessary to preserve their balance of payments and the value
of their currency. Since acceptance of Article VIII, § 4 determines whether a
member's currency is convertible, it is expedient for a member to remove all
restrictions preventing convertibility of currency as soon as feasible because re-
purchase transactions with the IMF must be in convertible currencies or gold. In
this regard the IMF reserves the right to make representations to the member
that conditions are favorable for removing restrictions. It should be emphasized
that Article VIII is the standard for all members irrespective of which class they
are in. If a member contemplates an action improper under Article XIV, then the
action will be governed by Article VIII. IMF & PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS,
16-20.
11 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. I (iv).
27 IMF & PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 7.8Id. at 8.
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the IMF.29 If the member, however, requires its residents to surrender
the foreign exchange proceeds received in an international transaction for
the equivalent in domestic currency, the requirement is a control and not
contrary to the member's obligation." Thus, a restriction is a direct
governmental limitation that inhibits a resident in obtaining and using
currency either domestic or foreign; whereas, a control is a legitimate
procedure that the resident must follow to obtain the currency. If reason-
able, a control does not in any way interfere with a resident's use of
currency for a transaction, but merely allows the government to control
foreign currency within its territories. Within this framework a system
of free payments is maintained by allowing the country whose resident
is receiving payment to designate the currency that is to be received while
prohibiting the nation whose resident is the payor from placing any limita-
tion on the currency that can be used for the payment.3"
This obligation to avoid restrictions applies to restrictions on both pay-
ments and transfers. In IMF terminology payment means, as it does in
other contexts, the tendering of money as the consideration for goods and
services received. Any direct governmental interference with the resi-
dent's ability to obtain currency to make the tender is a restriction on pay-
ment. A restriction on payment, therefore, depends primarily on the
character of the interference so that any action taken by a government
will be a restriction on payment only if it is in the form of a direct limita-
tion32 on the availability of currency as, for example, requiring a license to
obtain currency for current international transactions.33  A transfer, on
the other hand, concerns the use that the recipient makes of the currency
after the payment has been made so that a restriction on a transfer is de-
termined more by the character of the transaction itself. Thus, the con-
version from one currency to another by a nonresident of the proceeds of
a transaction is a transfer; therefore, the member cannot restrict this
transaction, nor may the member prohibit the nonresident from using his
proceeds for another current international transaction. 4  In addition
to the effect on individuals receiving payment, this provision in a broader
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current account with another member will be able to use that surplus to
meet its deficit with a third member."5
Finally, cognizance must be taken of the meaning of "current"," as
used in the Articles, for the definition encroaches upon some categories
that the economist would regard as capital in nature such as payments for
amortization or depreciation of direct investments.37 It should be noted,
moreover, that members are expressly given the right to restrict capital
transfers, though this right is qualified somewhat by the limitation that
capital transfers cannot have the side effect of unduly delaying settlement
of current transactions.38
In becoming a party to the Fund Agreement, a member further obli-
gates itself to avoid discriminatory currency arrangements.3" This type
arrangement is the third class of exchange practices prohibited by the
IMF, the other two being restrictions on payments and transfers for
current international transactions and multiple currency practices, that is,
using differing rates of exchange for a single currency." Since the prac-
tices overlap, they are often difficult to distinguish in practice.4 ' Although
not all restrictions on payments and transfers for current international
transactions or on multiple currency practices are discriminatory in nature,
" IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAW 17." For purposes of transactions under the Articles the meaning of "current" is
defined as follows:
Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for the
purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current busi-
ness, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit
facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other
investments;
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for de-
preciation of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned, determine
whether certain specific transactions are to be considered current transactions
or capital transactions.
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XIX(i).
" IMF & PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 12-13.
"According to the Articles:
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate interna-
tional capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a
manner which will restrict payments for current transactions ....
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. VI, § 3.
"Id. art. VIII, § 3.
40 The par value system of the Fund Agreement anticipates not only a fixed
rate of exchange but a unitary rate. IMF & PRIVATE BusINEss TRANSACTIONS 5.
"' Id. at 15.
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a discriminatory currency arrangement is frequently in the form of a
restriction or multiple currency practice.42 To be within the purview 'of the
prohibition, the arrangement must, however, have a direct relation to
currency, 43 for the restriction is on discriminatory currency arrangements.
If the arrangement directly affects trade, but not currency-for example,
a limitation on imports-then it is not within the prohibition 4 even though
such a limitation might affect the free flow of currencies. Further, since
the right to restrict capital transfers is not expressly limited by this
obligation, and interpretation by the IMF has not made them subject there-
to, it appears that the arrangement must also be for a current transaction.
In effect, therefore, it is possible for a member to discriminate by per-
mitting capital transfers to or from some members but not to others.45
Although bilateral arrangements-arrangements between two nations
usually containing reciprocity clauses-are most often the device used for
discrimination, the obligation restricts both bilateral and unilateral dis-
criminatory currency practices.4" Furthermore, discriminatory bilateral
arrangements are not limited to those merely between members of the
IMF, but encompass arrangements between a member and nonmember
that are discriminatory and adversely affect another member.4' The IMF,
in keeping with its purposes, has consistently encouraged members to
refrain from engaging in bilateral practices and to establish as quickly as
possible a system of multilateral payments.4" Given the dual nature of
discriminatory currency practices as being a restriction as well, it would




1I d. at 15-16.
" Id. at 16.
"IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-22.
"In one of its policy decisions the IMF stressed this need as follows:
Fund policies and attitude on bilateral arrangements which involve the use
of exchange restrictions and represent limitations on a multilateral system
of payments are an integral part of its policy on restrictions. . . [T]he
Fund urges the full collaboration of all its members to reduce and to eliminate
as rapidly as practicable reliance on bilateralism .. . Unless this policy is
energetically pursued by all countries . . . there is serious risk that wide-
spread restrictions, particularly of a discriminatory character, will persist...
This whole problem is one not only for countries which maintain bilateral
arrangements but also for other countries whose domestic and foreign eco-
nomic policy may adversely affect the balance of payments of other members.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE Di-
RECTORS Decisipn No. 433-(55/42), at 76-77 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED
DECISIONS].
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such an arrangement. This duty to consult and collaborate with the IMF
is paramount in all currency practices contemplated by a member, for it is
the conduit leading to the fulfillment of all the other obligations, which
are the essence of the Fund Agreement.
RESOURCES AND OPERATION
To assist members in performing their obligations under the Fund
Agreement, the IMF maintains a pool of assets available for use by mem-
bers either conditionally or unconditionally depending on the amount
and nature of the transaction. These assets are derived primarily from
the quota and subscription scheme prescribed by the Articles.", When a
nation becomes a member of the IMF, it is assigned a quota expressed in
a fixed number of American dollars. The member's subscription, which
is the amount the government is to contribute to the IMF, is the same as
the member's quota. Usually payment of the subscription is made by pay-
ing twenty-five percent of the quota in gold and the remaining seventy-five
percent in the member's currency.50 Once the subscription is paid, the
IMF becomes the absolute owner51 of the money and can administer it to
pursue the purposes of the Fund Agreement. In the operations of the IMF,
a member's quota also serves as the basis for determining the extent to
which a member is eligible to get assistance and as a basis for the IMF's
tranche policy.52 A member's use of the IMF that does not increase the
IMF's holdings of its particular currency above one hundred percent
"ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT Art. III.
°Id. art. III, § 3(b) & (c). After Malta became a member of the IMF on
September 11, 1968, membership totaled one hundred and ten members, and the
total of all members' quotas amounted to 21,182,450,000 dollars. 20 Int'l Fin. News
Survey, Sept. 13, 1968, at 301. Art. III, § 2 provides for adjustments in members'
quotas, and as of April 30, 1968, ninety-four members had increased their quotas
pursuant to two Resolutions of the Board of Governors adopted March 31, 1965, one
of which provided for a general increase of twenty-five percent for all members and
special increases for sixteen members. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL
REPORT 97 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 ANNUAL REPORT].
"IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAW 22.
The term "tranche" comes from the French la tranche meaning a slice or
section. In IMF parlance the term is used to indicate the portion of the IMF's
assets that a member is using in relation to its quota. The tranches are marked off
at intervals of twenty-five percent of quota. To avoid confusion in understanding
the concept of the tranche, the phrase "holdings of currency" should be emphasized.
When a member subscribes its quota, the IMF's holdings of its currency is usually
seventy-five percent of its quota. Thus, when a member purchases the currency of
another member equal to twenty-five percent of the purchasing member's quota,
the purchase increases the IMF's holdings of the purchasing member's currency to
one hundred percent of quota.
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of its quota is within the member's gold tranche.3 Any use which in-
creases the IMF's holdings of the member's currency above one hundred
percent of the member's quota is within the credit tranche.54 This use of
the word "credit" should not be mistaken as implying a debtor-creditor
relationship because the distinction in the terms used merely indicates that
when a member is within its gold tranche it is availing itself of the funds
only to the extent of its economic contribution to the IMF, but within the
credit tranche it is using the IMF beyond its gold subscription.5 5 Use of
the IMF within the gold tranche is virtually automatic; whereas, within
the credit tranche the criteria for the adequate safeguard required by
Article I is much more rigid.5"
When a member uses the IMF, a charge 7 is imposed for the use, and
the money received therefor becomes part of the pool of resources dis-
posable by the IMF. For the fiscal year ending on April 30, 1968, these
service charges on drawings amounted to 7 million dollars, and the charges
levied on the IMF's holdings of members' currencies in excess of their
"The gold tranche is so named because a member's use of the IMF's assets
within this range does not exceed the member's gold subscription of its quota. If
a member has a quota of 100 million dollars and has paid 75 million dollars in its
own currency and the equivalent of 25 million dollars in gold and the IMF has
sold 10 million dollars of the member's currency to another member, then a pur-
chase by the member of 35 million dollars is within its gold tranche because the
IMF's holdings of its currency have not been increased above one hundred percent
of quota.
"' If a member has a quota of 100 million dollars, 25 million dollars of which has
been paid in gold and 75 million dollars of which has been paid in the currency of
the member, and the IMF has not sold any of the member's currency, then a pur-
chase by the member of 35 million dollars would be 25 million dollars within the
gold tranche and 10 million dollars within the credit tranche.
" Gold, The Next Stage in the Development of International Monetary Law:
the Deliberate Control of Liquidity, 62 Am. J. OF INT'L L. 365, 369 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as The Next Stage].
" When the IMF first began operations, members were somewhat reluctant to
request purchases from the assets because they feared that their requests for drawings
would be refused. To dispel this fear and give the members assurance of assistance,
the IMF announced a policy that made drawings within the gold tranche virtually
automatic. A request for drawings was still subject to challenge, but any doubts as
to the purposes for which the drawing was being made were to be resolved in favor
of the member. This relaxed policy regarding gold tranche drawings has never been
adopted with respect to credit tranche drawings. Id. at 370-71.
"' The charge for the purchase of another member's currency is levied at the
uniform rate of three-fourths of one percent in addition to the parity price. The IMF
may increase the charge to one percent or reduce it to not less than one-half percent.
In addition, charges are levied on the average daily balances of a member's currency
in excess of its quota. The rates for these charges vary depending upon the
percentage above the quota and the length of time that the holdings remain in excess
of quota. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. V, § 8(a) & (c).
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quotas came to 82 million dollars."" If the necessity arises for the IMF
to replenish its currency holdings, there are two ways in which this may
be accomplished. One is by selling gold to the member whose currency
is sought. The other is by borrowing member currencies." The IMF
may borrow either from a member or a nonmember, but only member
currencies can be borrowed from the nonmember."' Under the General
Arrangements to Borrow, which the IMF first entered into in 1962 with
eight members and the central banks of two others, the IMF has the
capacity to supplement its resources up to 6 billion dollars in the currency
of ten industrial member countries.61 The importance of this arrangement
to the operations of the IMF is illustrated by the fact that in the month
of June 1968 the IMF was able to raise 881 million dollars through the
General Arrangements to Borrow to meet pressing demands by members."2
At the present time there are three different arrangements by which
members use the IMF's resources. These are the Drawing Rights, the
Stand-by Arrangements and the Compensatory Financing Arrangement."
Subject to the approval of the required number of members, a fourth
' 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 105, 107.
IMF & INTERNATIONAL LAW 26.I01d. For example, Switzerland is not a member of the IMF; therefore, the IMF
may borrow a member currency, such as United States dollars, from Switzerland, but
it cannot borrow Swiss currency.
" The ten countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 1968 ANNUAL
REPORT 107. The General Arrangements to Borrow was renewed in 1966 and
reviewed again in 1968 at which time it was agreed by the participating members
that the Arrangement should continue unchanged until October 1970. Address by
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of IMF, 1968 Annual Meeting IMF
Bd. of Governors, Sept. 30, 1968.
02 Address by Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, supra note 61.
The Compensatory Financing Decision, which was formulated in 1963 and
greatly expanded in 1966, "aims at offsetting the consequences of a temporary short-
fall in export earnings, whether due to fluctuation in prices or other factors." Ad-
dress by Pierre-Paul Schweitzer before the Economic and Social Council of the
U.N., Dec. 5, 1968. The 1966 amendment to the Compensatory Financing Decision
provides for drawings made under the compensatory facility to be separated from
other drawings so that they will not be included in determining the member's
ability to draw under the normal policies controlling use of the IMF's resources.
[These policies will be discussed subsequently in this paper.] The amended decision
also provides for reclassification of purchases made previous to the amendment as
compensatory facility drawings. Such a reclassification of course increases the
member's ability to make drawings under the normal policies. The significance of
this decision is manifested by the purchase of 220 million dollars under the Com-
pensatory Financing Decision by twelve members during the fiscal year ending
April 30, 1968. 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 19, 98.
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arrangement, the Special Drawing Rights, will be in effect.
6 To avail
itself of the IMF's resources, the member must show that the purpose for
which the assistance is sought is in keeping with the purposes outlined in
the Articles, and in all cases the use must be temporary."
5 Thus, built into
all transactions are provisions to keep the resources revolving.
Drawing Rights
What has in IMF terminology come to be called the Drawing Rights
is referred to in the Articles of Agreement by the terms "purchase" and
"repurchase." Because of the nature of the transaction, no usual legal
labels such as a loan or purchase and sale are strictly applicable, but an
exchange transaction is the one to which it bears the closest resemblance.
66
The member purchases currency from the IMF in return for its own
currency, and within a given period of time, usually five years, the mem-
ber must repurchase its own currency.6 7 To make the repurchase a mem-
ber must use either gold or the convertible currency6" of other members.
But the currency of a member cannot be utilized for the repurchase if
IMF holdings of its currency would be increased beyond seventy-five per-
cent of its quota.69 Obviously, therefore, the repurchase does not have to
be made with the same currency purchased. If the IMF has sold currency
of the member scheduled to make repayment so that the holdings of that
member are below seventy-five percent of its quota, this sale extinguishes
pro tanto the requirement to repurchase to the extent that the holdings
"' ARTIcLES OF AGREEMENT arts. XXI-XXXII (proposed amends. 1968), found
in 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 157-68 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amends.].
" The temporary nature of any use of the IMF's assets is central in its philoso-
phy, for otherwise its underlying purposes to assist countries with balance of pay-
ments difficulties and to give stability to currency while encouraging the free flow
of currency and trade would be thwarted. Evidence that the temporary nature is
fundamental is found in the proposed amendment to Article I(v) which adds the
word "temporarily" so that the section reads: "To give confidence to members by
making the Fund's resources temporarily available to them under adequate safe-
guards.... ." Proposed Amend. art. I(v).
"6 The Next Stage 366.
" Articles of Agreement art. V, §§ (2) & (7). See also Gold, The Law and
Practice of the International Monetary Fund with Respect to "Stand-By Arrange-
ments," 12 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 1, 3 (1963).
"8 Convertible currencies refers to the currencies of members who are not avail-
ing themselves of the transitional arrangements under Article XIV, § 2 and the
currencies of such nonmembers as the IMF may specify. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
art. XIX (d). For an explanation of the meaning of the transitional arrangements,
see note 25 supra.
"' The Next Stage 367.
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of the member's currency are below seventy-five percent of its quota.70
For example, if member A has purchased an amount equal to twenty-five
percent of its quota, and the IMF has sold to member B currency of A
equal to fifteen percent of A's quota, then A is required to repurchase only
the remaining ten percent above its quota.
Limits on the member's use of the IMF are expressed both in terms of
quantity and time. One limit is imposed on the basis of total outstanding
net use of the funds.7 Under this policy a member may not increase the
IMF's holdings of its currency beyond two hundred percent of its quota.72
Under certain circumstances the IMF may permit larger purchases, but
it is not readily inclined to do so. The other limit is expressed in terms
of time. In the absence of a waiver by the IMF, in any twelve month
period ending with the date of the purchase, a member can purchase cur-
rencies only in an amount equal to twenty-five percent of its quota.7 8 It
has been common practice, however, for the IMF in recent years to grant
a waiver permitting larger purchases,74 especially if the twenty-five percent
represents the gold tranche of the member. Before making a purchase,
the member is expected to consult with the IMF regarding the choice of
currency, and in making the decision, the IMF considers factors such as
the strength of the balance of payments and reserve positions of members
along with the relative levels of the IMF's holdings of those currencies."
Stand-By Arrangements
Although not expressly provided for in the Fund Agreement, one
vital and functional procedure of the IMF is the stand-by arrangements.
"70 Gold, supra note 67, at 3.
71 The Next Stage 368.
7,The Fund Agreement states:
A member shall be entitled to buy the currency of another member from
the Fund in exchange for its own currency subject to the following conditions:
(iii) "The proposed purchase would not cause the Fund's holdings of the
purchasing member's currency to increase by more than twenty-five
percent of its quota during the period of twelve months ending on the
date of the purchase nor to exceed two hundred percent of its quota....
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. V, § 3(a) (iii).
78 Id.
7' The Next Stage 368.
71 Id. at 374. It is interesting to note that United States drawings on the IMF
have totaled 1,840 million dollars, but the effect has been offset partially by the sale
of United States dollars to other members. Therefore, the drawings have always
been less than the country's 1,290 million dollar gold subscription. In October, 1968,
the United States' net drawings were within 270 million dollars of repayment. IMF
Memorandum, Oct. 30, 1968, at 1.
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When a member applies to use drawing rights, the assistance is to be
received immediately. Frequently, however, a country may not need
additional resources at once, but may need them in the future, or what
is more important, may need the assurance of future assistance to obtain
current credit from another source."' Recognizing this need for assurance
to give confidence to development planning, the IMF, on October 1, 1952,
issued a general policy decision establishing stand-by arrangements as a
practice of the IMF.7" Though revised and modified subsequently, the
stand-by arrangement has remained a prime method for obtaining assis-
tance. The flexibility of the instrument makes- the- stand-by arrangement
attractive for varied purposes such as "to sustain confidence in currencies
under pressure because of international emergencies, to provide additional
resources to members during seasonal difficulties, to support programmes
intended to stabilize economies [and] to provide backing for currency
reforms. ... "I'
In determining whether to enter into a stand-by arrangement, the
standards applied are usually the same as those applied when a member
wishes to exercise an immediate drawing right. Once the arrangement
is granted, however, the IMF agrees to forgo review of a request to make
a purchase when it is submitted by the member. 79 It is this last concession,
of course, which gives the member the assurance anticipated by the stand-
by arrangement.
The period of a stand-by arrangement is normally twelve months, and
renewals are fairly common practice although a request for a renewal is
treated as an application de novo. ° Once a drawing is made under the
stand-by arrangement, use of the currency drawn is generally three years
so that the overall strain on the liquidity of the IMF is four years"' from
the date the arrangement was entered into. Just as with an immediate
drawing, the member is under a duty to repurchase its own currency, but
there is a revolving right under the stand-by arrangement, which in-
creases the member's ability to make further drawings under the arrange-
ment when repurchase is made.82 The benefits of the revolving right do
not accrue, however, when repurchase is made for a drawing right exer-
" Gold, supra note 67, at 4.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 5.
70 Id. at 16.
0 Id. at 7.
'1 Id. at 23.
1Id. at 8, 13.
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cised prior to the date the stand-by arrangement was entered into.83 Also,
a sale of the member's currency by the IMF to another member discharges
to that extent the obligation to repay under the stand-by arrangement,
but does not augment the member's right to make purchases.
84
The success and utility of the stand-by arrangement has been particu-
larly manifest in the case of developing countries. Since the stand-by
arrangement was first instituted in 1952, over four-fifths of the exchange
transactions with these countries have been in the form of stand-by arrange-
ments.s5 By using this arrangement, developing countries can weather
periods of stress and restore balance in their economy without suffering
a slow'down in development. At the same time the basic development
plan is preserved and opportunities for additional resources at home and
abroad arise because stability is restored."' This statement should not be
taken to minimize the importance of these arrangements for other coun-
tries. As the United Kingdom's drawing of 1,400 million dollars under
a stand-by arrangement in November, 1967, to meet a gold crisis8 7 indi-
cates, the benefits of this arrangement aid both the developed and the under-
developed nations.
Special Drawing Rights
The most recent development in the IMF that would provide members
with additional resources is the program of proposed special drawing
rights. The creation of this provision entails an amendment to the Fund
Agreement, which has been presented to and accepted by the Board of
Governors and must now be accepted by three-fifths of the members having
four-fifths of the total voting power to go into force.88 Motivation for
drafting the proposal stemmed from the growing conviction on the part
of monetary authorities that as the volume of international economic
activity grows, international liquidity must also grow; otherwise the
lack of reserves would have a contractionary effect on international eco-
nomic activity because governments would introduce restrictive policies.80
Thus, a deliberate means to assure sufficient liquidity in the form of
reserves was needed.
'3Id. at 10-13.
" Id. at 9-10, 24.
5 Address by Pierre-Paul Schweitzer before the Economic and Social Council
of the U.N., Dec. 5, 1968.86 Id.
s, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 19.
" ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XVII(a).
" The Next Stage 375.
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In terms of operation, special drawing rights and drawing rights
are quite dissimilar. The special drawing rights will be administered by
the IMF through a special drawing account9 0 separate and apart from the
general account, which is the pool of assets used for drawing rights and
stand-by arrangements. In fact, with special drawing rights there will be
no pool of assets supplied by subscriptions. There will, however, be a
quota for each member equal to the member's quota in the general account,
and this quota will be the basis on which special drawing rights will be
allocated to all participants. 91 A decision to allocate special drawing rights
requires an eighty-five percent vote of the total voting power,92 and in
making the decision to submit the proposed allocation to a vote the IMF
must consider the overall long-term balance of payments situation to
determine if there is an actual need to create new reserve assets.9
Once the allocation has been made, the participant may use its special
drawing rights for the purposes stated in the section headed "Require-
ment of Need." '94 In utilizing its special drawing rights, the member
obtains the currency directly from another member designated by the IMF
"0 "All operations and transactions involving special drawing rights shall be
conducted through the Special Drawing Account. All other operations and transac-
tions of the Fund authorized by or under this Agreement shall be conducted through
the General Account." Proposed Amend. art. XXII, § 1.
i The Next Stage 392.
0 1Proposed Amend. art. XXIV, § 4(d).
o The considerations governing allocations and cancellations of special drawing
rights are stated in the following proposal:
(a) In all its decisions with respect to the allocation and cancellation of
special drawing rights the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term global
need, as and when it arises, to supplement existing reserve assets in
such manner as will promote the attainment of its purposes and will
avoid economic stagnation and deflation as well as excess demand and
inflation in the world.
(b) The, first decision to allocate special drawing rights shall take into
account, as special considerations, a collective judgment that there is a
global need to supplement reserves, and the attainment of a better balance
of payments equilibrium, as well as the likelihood of a better working
of the adjustment process in the future.
Proposed Amend. art. XXIV, § 1 (a) & (b). See also The Next Stage 393, 395.
", This section states:
[A] participant will be expected to use its special drawing rights only to
meet balance of payments needs or in the light of developments in its official
holdings of gold, foreign exchange, and special drawing rights, and its
reserve position in the Fund. ...
Proposed Amend. art. XXV, § 3(a). Under this provision if a member is not
in deficit in its balance of payments but is losing gold to other members, it may still
use special drawing rights to prevent the loss of gold. 1968 ANNuAL REoRT app.
I, Annex B, Outline § V, 1(c), at 172.
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to receive equivalent special drawing rights."' Although there is a pro-
vision stating that the member can obtain currency through the special
drawing account,90 this means simply that the IMF will arrange for the
transfer.9" By going through the special drawing account, the participant,
of course, has the assurance that the transferee is a proper one under the
rules of designation." The member designated to receive special drawing
rights is under a legal obligation to accept the special drawing rights and
provide therefor an equivalent amount of a currency convertible in fact.
Thus, the member using special drawing rights receives currency, and the
member providing the currency receives special drawing rights as the
quid pro quo.100 Under this arrangement a member is assured that it
will be able to use its special drawing because the IMF designates the
recipient, and the participant so designated is obligated to provide the
currency upon pain of forfeiting its right to any use of special drawing
rights.101
As with all arrangements under the the IMF, it is contemplated that
a member's use of special drawing rights will be for a limited time only,
usually five years. Consequently, there is a provision for reconstituting
special drawing rights,0 2 which is analogous to that for repurchase under
the drawing rights provisions.' °3 The most usual way for reconstituting
special drawing rights will be for the participant needing to reconstitute
to accept special drawing rights from other members in return for its
currency.'0 4 Underlying the reconstitution policy is the principle that a
"Proposed Amend. art. XXV, § 2.
" 1968 ANNUAL REPORT app. I, Annex B, Outline § V, 1 (b), at 172.
" The Next Stage 390.
"8 Id. Under the proposed amendments the IMF insures that a member will be
able to use its special drawing rights by designating participants to provide currency
for specified amounts of drawing rights. In making the designation, the IMF is
to consider such factors as the participant's balance of payments and gross reserve
position, the overall balance of distribution of holdings of special drawing rights,
and the need of the participant to reconstitute its special drawing rights. Proposed
Amend. art. XXV, § 5(a).
Proposed Amend. art. XXV, § 4.
100 The Next Stage 385.
... The severity of this sanction reveals the fundamental nature of the duty to
receive drawing rights and provide currency. With other improper actions under
the special drawing rights the sanction is merely to forfeit use of special drawing
rights accrued after the infringement rather than forfeiture of all use. Id. at 386;
1968 ANNUAL REPORT app. I, Annex B, Outline § VIII, 2, at 173.
"'Proposed Amend. art. XXV, § 6; 1968 ANNUAL REPORT app. I, sched. G, at
168-69.




member's use of special drawing rights on the basis of the five preceeding
years shall not exceed seventy percent of its average net cumulative alloca-
tion during this period.10 5
Just what the future actual effect of this new provision will be is
subject to conjecture, for at this juncture the new facility is not even
established. The potential significance, however, is summed up in the
following statement from the 1968 Annual Report:
The broad impact of the new facility will be that it will permit the
Fund to assure an appropriate level of international reserves in the light
of the needs of the world economy, by supplementing the existing re-
serve assets in the form of gold and reserve currencies. For the first
time, therefore, the total stock of reserves and its rate of growth will
reflect deliberate international decisions rather than being determined
solely by the availability of gold for official reserves and the accumula-
tion of balances in reserve currencies. . . . [T]he Fund will become
a major source for the supply of both unconditional and conditional
liquidity. 0 0
THE FUND AGREEMENT AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
By accepting the Articles of Agreement, members bind themselves to
certain obligations. These undertakings are applicable not only to the
member governments but also to citizens and corporations within a
member's territory. Thus far the discussions in this paper have dealt
with the public international law aspects of the IMF; its significance in
private international law also deserves consideration. As would be ex-
pected, it is in this area that the Articles have most frequently been an
issue in litigation. Litigation under the Articles cannot be discussed, how-
ever, without first mentioning the significance of Article XVIII since
in some instances it may be decisive of the case.
"05 1968 ANNUAL REPORT append. I, Annex B, Outline § V, 4(b) (i), at 173.
The formula may also be expressed as follows:
A participant's net cumulative allocation of rights on any date is the total of
all rights allocated to the participant up to the date in question, minus any
of its rights that have been cancelled. A participant's average holdings of
special drawing rights during a five-year period should not be less than thirty
percent of the average during the same period of the participant's net cumu-
lative allocation as thus defined.
The Next Stage 387.
... 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 16. For a detailed analysis of economic policies and
the significance of the special drawing rights, see Comment, Legal Problems of
International Monetary Reform, 20 STAN. L. REv. 870 (1968).
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The Interpretative Power Under Article XVIII
In the Articles of Agreement the one provision that is probably unique
among international organizations is the power of the IMF to interpret its
own charter. Article XVIII provides:
(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agree-
ment arising between any member and the Fund or between any
members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Directors
for their decision....
(b) In any case where the Executive Directors have given a decision
under (a) above, any member may require that the question
be referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be
final .... 107
With most other international organizations, final interpretation is vested
in some external agency, but with the IMF the same organ, the Executive
Directors, that has many other functions and responsibilities also inter-
prets the Agreement.' °8 One reason for such an arrangement was the
recognition that another tribunal would not have expertise in the matters
that would be the subject of interpretation. 0 9
Supplementing the obligation of members to collaborate with the
IMF, the Executive Directors have issued many interpretations eluci-
dating various complexities of the IMF. However, very few of these
decisions have been made under the express provisions of Article XVIII.
This does not mean that decisions made outside Article XVIII are less
important, but it does perhaps indicate a desire on the part of the
Executive Directors to maintain flexibility since such decisions are in-
formal and have less aura of finality. 1
Of all the decisions issued by the Executive Directors the one that
has provoked the most discussion among lawyers and had the greatest
influence in private international law is the interpretation of Article VIII,
section 2(b), the first sentence of which states:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this agreement shall be un-
enforceable in the territories of any member."'
'
0 7 
ARTIcLES OF AGREEMENT art. XVIII (a) & (b).
1o8 Gold, The Interpretation by the International Monetary Fund of its Artlicles
of Agreement, 3 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 256, 257 (1954).
2
0 9 Id. at 258.
"Old. 'at 259, 264.
"' ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. VIII, §2(b).
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The interpretation explains that parties who enter into a contract that
violates the above provision cannot "receive the assistance of the judicial
or administrative authorities of other members in obtaining the perform-
ance of such contracts."'" 2 Such contracts are not to be implemented by
judicial authorities either by decreeing performance or awarding damages
for nonperformance. Further, the interpretation states that acceptance of
the Fund Agreement means that a member has undertaken to make the
principle a part of its national law; consequently, when a party to a
contract violative of Article VIII, section 2(b), seeks to enforce it, the
tribunal cannot ignore the exchange control regulations of another coun-
try on the ground that such regulations are contrary to the public policy
of the forum." 3 Moreover, the tribunal likewise cannot enforce the con-
tract on the ground that under the private international law of the forum,
the law of the country imposing the exchange regulations is not the law
governing the exchange contract or its performance." 4 Although this in-
terpretation has, potentially, wide ramifications when applied in the
courts, its impact has not been overwhelming.
Attention should also be given to the binding effect of these interpre-
tations upon the courts and quasi-judicial bodies in the United States.
In International Bank for Reconstruction and Development v. All America
Cables and Radio, Inc.," 5 the question of whether the word "treatment"
in Article IX, section 7 embraces rates was submitted to the IMF for
interpretation. The Executive Directors declared that "treatment" did
include rates charged for official communications," 6 and the Federal
Communications Commission in deciding the case held that the interpre-
tation of the IMF was binding upon the parties. This holding is particu-
larly interesting since Article XVIII, granting the Executive Directors
power to interpret the articles, was not given the force of law in the
United States Bretton Woods Agreements Act."' The Commission, how-
ever, reasoned that since the United States had resorted to the interpre-
tation procedure in Sections 12 and 13 of its Bretton Woods Agreements
Act, the United States at least by implication felt bound by such interpre-
112 SELECTED DECISIONS Decision No. 446-4 (June 10, 1949), at 73-74.
... Id. at 74. For a discussion of the effect of giving some Articles, but not all,
the force and effect of law, see Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International
Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421, 422-23 (1950).
..4 SELECTED DECISIONS Decision No. 446-4 (June 10, 1949), at 74.
11 17 F.C.C. 450, 466-67 (1953).
211 SELECTED DECISIONS Decision No. 534-3 (Feb. 20, 1950), at 93-94.,
..7 Gold, supra note 108, at 268.
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tations." s Thus the broad base for the decision in this case was that the
United States through an executive agreement authorized by Congress
had accepted the Articles, including Article XVIII; consequently, under
the supremacy clause of the Constitution the Articles became the law of
the land.'19
Further support for the Commission's position is found in the Case
Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
M1lorocco (France v. United States) ,2 decided by the International Court
of Justice. There the United States agent in oral argument argued
that France had not complied with the compulsory requirement of
Article XVIII as the party seeking to justify action on the bases of the
Agreement by requesting an interpretation of the IMF's European Re-
covery Program decision.' 2' By making this argument, the United States,
therefore, by implication represented that it would be bound by such an
interpretation.
Court Decisions Applying the Articles
Before the Bretton Woods Conference, most courts, either on the
basis of public policy or on application of the private international law
of the forum, refused to give recognition to foreign exchange control law.122
As nations joined an international organization designed to create mone-
tary stability and eliminate exchange restrictions that hamper economic
development, it was realized, however, that there were times when bal-
ance of payments positions made it necessary for exchange control regula-
tions to be imposed. Consequently, under the terms of the Agreement in
Article VIII(2) (b), the members collaborated to give effect to fellow
members' exchange control regulations. 23 But in spite of the interpreta-
tion of this article issued by the IMF, the decisions have not been uniform
in their results and have produced legal debate.
2 4
This lack of consistency in deciding cases, despite striking similarities
in fact situations, may be attributable to several factors. First of all, as
with other innovations in the law, the judiciary has been hesitant to
I" J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 56-57 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as THE FUND AGREEM ENT IN THE COURTS].
... Gold, supra note 108, at 268.2- [1952] I.C.J. 176.
-' Oral Argument of the Agent for the United States, 2 Case Concerning Rights
of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, I.C.J. Pleadings 261
(1952).
_2'THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 9-0.
"'Id. at 11.
.. Gold, supra note 108, at 263.
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abandon its traditional interpretations and constructions. Thus, even when
the Agreement has been raised as a defense, the courts often have applied
narrow constructions, which circumvent application of the Agreement.
For example, in Cermak v. Bata Akciovia Spolecnost,"2 ' where the assign-
ees of a money claim owing to them from a Czechoslovakian corporation
brought an action to recoup the money, and warrants of attachments were
levied upon the credit balance which the defendant had with Guaranty
Trust Company, the defense was raised that under the Foreign Exchange
Regulations in force in Czechoslovakia, the defendant was prohibited from
making any payment to a nonresident without a license. The New York
Supreme Court held, however, that the plaintiffs could recover. The court
treated the license requirement as a penal law and stated that the Fund
Agreement did not abrogate the rule that "[t] he courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another."' 26 The court further held that the
plaintiffs could recover under their attachments because the Czecho-
slovakian Exchange Control Law could not prevent an adjudication of
defendant's liability, and then directed Guaranty Trust to pay the credit
balance to the plaintiffs. It is arguable that since the court found in
fact that the license had been obtained, it would have been a more accurate
treatment of the Agreement to say that the contract did not violate the
exchange control laws and that the law of New York, which was the
place of performance, governed.
Probably the most blatant example of a court's applying a traditional
precedent to the detriment of the Fund Agreement was in Southwestern
Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 2' where an Italian importer, need-
ing to pay American dollars but not having the required license, made a
deal with an Italian importer having such a license to deposit the money
in the National City Bank of New York in the name of one Anlyan.
Anlyan was to make an assignment to Southwestern Shipping, and did
in fact make the assignment, which was revoked before payment. When
the Bank paid Anlyan, he absconded, and Southwestern Shipping brought
the action against the Bank. Although the trial court's decision that the
suit was barred by both New York common law and Article VIII (2) (b)'"I
was affirmed by the Appellate Division,'29 the New York Court of Appeals
'- Misc. -, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948).1
.
2 Id. at -, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
.2 11 Misc. 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
28 Id.
.2 Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 6 App. Div. 2d 1036,
178 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1958).
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reversed on the ground that the Bank was merely the depository of the
proceeds of an illegal contract and thus could not raise the defense of
illegality of contract as a basis for refusing to perform. 3 0 The effect of
the decision was, of course, that one member of the IMF gave effect to a
contract evading the exchange control laws of another.' The reasoning
of the dissent, that this was a single transaction that would exclude the
Bank from the exception regarding depositories, would have been a more
satisfying result with respect to the Fund Agreement.
Not all the cases have done this injustice to the Articles. In Perutz v.
Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 32 plaintiff's intestate had worked
for a Czechoslovakian bank before coming to the United States. By the
terms of a contract with defendant's predecessor bank, the intestate was
entitled to a pension from the bank beginning in 1940. A previous judg-
ment had granted plaintiff's intestate all amounts due and owing up to
October 31, 1942, and this action was to recover the amounts due and
owing under the same contract from November 1, 1942, to the date of
the action. To pay the amounts the bank had to obtain a license from the
Foreign Exchange Control Authorities. The Appellate Division, using
the same reasoning of the court in Cermak, held that the plaintiff could
have judgment because under Czechoslovakian law or any other law the
plaintiff could have judgment without the license having been issued,
although execution of the judgment might not be obtainable.1 3 Further,
the judgment could be satisfied out of defendant's New York account,
which had been attached, since foreign currency regulations could have
no control over funds within the jurisdiction of the New York court.
To hold otherwise would give undue extraterritorial effect to foreign
law. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals' reversed, holding that the
contract was governed by the law of Czechoslovakia, the place where it
was made and to be performed. The defendant had performed the contract
as permitted by that law, and thus the New York courts were bound to
give effect to the exchange control regulation because both the United
States and Czechoslovakia were parties to the Fund Agreement.
Although the case rests upon the Articles of Agreement, it illustrates
"' Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160
N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959).
STEFUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 106-08.
132 279 App. Div. 386, 110 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1952), rev'd, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d
6 (1953).133 Id.




a second reason why there has not been uniformity in applying the Fund
Agreement, namely, the failure of the courts to identify precisely the basis
of decisions. The opinion in Perutz leaves room for speculation as to
whether the decision is predicated on the narrow basis of Article VIII
(2) (b) or whether it rest on the broader basis of the general treaty
obligation.135 In the latter circumstance, the court would be giving wider
recognition to foreign exchange control regulations than is necessarily
demanded by the limited scope of "exchange contracts" under Article
VIII (2) (b)." 36 A similar criticism could be made of Kolovrat v. Ore-
gon,137 the only case involving the Articles of Agreement to be decided
by the United States Supreme Court to date. One authority has eluci-
dated three possibilities for the ratio decidendi"3 s of the case. Confronted
with this equivocal opinion, state courts lack clear direction in cases
concerned with the Fund Agreement.
Finally, a third possible reason for variation in the cases is the
failure of the Fund Executive Directors to make a more definitive
interpretation of Article VIII(2) (b). Merely knowing that a member's
1. THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 52-53. See also Meyer, Recognition
of Exchange Controls after the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE
L.J. 867 (1953), for a discussion supporting the argument that the decision was
predicated on Article VIII, § 2(b).
'
3 THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 52.
,3 366 U.S. 187 (1961). Here the Court gave effect to the Fund Agreement
by holding that Oregon could not refuse payment of the intestate's estate to his
only heirs and next of kin, who were residents of Yugoslavia, on the basis of an
Oregon statute that directed that such estates would escheat to the state unless
under similar circumstances the foreign government would make payment to a
United States citizen in the United States. The Court rejected the argument that
the foreign exchange control laws of Yugoslavia could preclude the meeting of
the condition.
... The possibilities set forth were:
(1) [that] even if the Yugoslav authorities were to restrict transfers of
Yugoslav inheritances to U.S. heirs in the United States, this restriction
would be consistent with the Fund Agreement, for which reason Oregon
could not prevent the petitioners from succeeding to the Oregon in-
heritance;
(2) [that] the petitioners must succeed on their petition because the Yugo-
slav exchange control regulations in existence were consistent with the
Fund Agreement, the Fund Agreement prevented the exercise of the
controls in such a way as to restrict the transfers of inheritances, and
the Yugoslav authorities were observing this rule by not in fact re-
stricting them;
(3) [that] the petitioners were entitled to succeed because the Yugoslav
authorities were not restricting transfers of inheritances to U.S. heirs
in the United States, and because the exchange control regulations in
existence were consistent with the Fund Agreement.
THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 131-134.
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judicial bodies cannot on the basis of ordre public give effect to a contract
violative of the Article leaves much room for judicial discretion on nu-
merous issues. For example, must the party sued be a party to the con-
tract; at what point in time is the article applicable-when the contract
is made or when enforcement is sought; what is an exchange contract;
what contracts involve currency transactions; does unenforceability in-
clude damages for conduct in making or performing the contract.'30 All
these questions and others are left for judicial determination in each case.
From time to time several of these issues140 have been dealt with by courts
in the United States, but the body of law pertaining thereto is by no
means solidified. The one possible exception to this statement is with
respect to the time when effect is to be given to Article VIII (2) (b). At
least three cases' have disallowed a defense based on the Fund Agree-
ment because the country having the exchange control law had withdrawn
from the IMF since the making of the contract. Thus, by implication at
least, the crucial time is when the parties seek enforcement. 142 This still
leaves open the question of enforceability where the member joins the IMF
after the contract was made. But if the same logic were applied, the Fund
Agreement would have retroactive effect; the burden of risk would fall
on the parties and the contract would be unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
How courts will interpret and construe the Articles of Agreement in
the future is elusive of prediction. The assumption may be made, howeyer,
that as productivity and trade throughout the world increase, the volume
of litigation will also increase. Courts accustomed to the comfortable
... For a discussion of these problems, see Mann, The Private International
Law of Exchange Control Under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 2
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 97 (1953).
1 'In Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co., 29 Misc. 229, 215
N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 652, 216 N.Y.S.2d 669, aff'd,
12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
906 (1964), the court dealt with the question of whether the Article can be the
basis for a cause of action as well as a defense. It should be noted, moreover, that
in every case, though not necessarily expressed, the court must make a determina-
tion as to whether the foreign exchange law and the contract are the type con-
templated by the Articles of Agreement.
" Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966); Con-
federation Life Ass'n v. Vega y Arminan, 207 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1968); Stephen v.
Zivnostenska Banka Nat'l Corp., 31 Misc. 45, 140 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct.), aftPd,
286 App. Div. 999, 145 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1955), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 862, 145 N.E.2d 24,
166 N.Y.2d 309 (1957), appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 22 (1958).
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doctrine of ordre public will be faced with applying and construing the
Articles of Agreement under which nations have relinquished the pro-
tection of the public policy of the forum to the larger world policy of
monetary cooperation. The hope must be, therefore, that courts as
well as nations will not lose sight of the Fund Agreement's paramount
purposes to establish exchange stability and equilibrium in balance of
payments, with the ultimate aim of eradicating human distress resulting
from economic chaos.
SARAH E. PARKER
Survey of the United States Supreme Court Decisions Affecting
Labor-Management Relations During the 1967-1968 Term
INTRODUCTION
The labor law decisions of the Supreme Court during the 1967-1968
term were significant primarily in their attempt to reconcile the rights
of individuals with the power of those interests controlling collective
bargaining groups. Throughout the opinions institutional power, what-
ever its form, is closely examined by the Court when such power appears
to infringe upon individual or minority rights. In addition, the cases last
term show an increased willingness on the part of the Court to enlarge
the power of those agencies and officials who traditionally safeguard the
rights of union members.
Also decided by the Court last term were two opinions specifically aimed
at employer actions, one case presenting a first amendment question in the
area of picketing, an opportunity, which the Court declined, to settle the
conflict between section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act' and section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act.2  A total of twelve labor law
opinions were rendered by the Court, and this comment will present an
analytical digest of them.
UNION ELECTIONS
The Supreme Court heard three cases last term involving the inter-
pretation of Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
' Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
261 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
19691
